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Choice-of-law theory has not been characterized by a sense of flex-
ibility and accommodation. The rigidity of First Restatement territori-
alism t was folowed by a doctrine of interest analysis2 which was
equally rigid in its approach.3 The efforts of the Second Restatement4
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I RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934); J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1935); Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their.Role and Utility, 58 HARV.
L. REV. 361 (1945). See generally Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209 (1922); Forbes v.
Forbes, 226 Wis. 477, 277 N.W. 112 (1938); Alabama Great S. R.R. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So.
803 (1892).
2 B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963). See generally Rosenthal
v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973); Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964). See
also Baade, Judge Keating and the Conflict of Laws, 36 BROOKLYN L. REV. 10 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Baade 1969]; Baade, Counter-Revolution orAlliancefor Progress? Reflections on Reading
Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process, 46 TEx. L. REv. 141 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Baade 1967];
Sedler, Characterization, Identification of the Problem Area and the Policy-Centered Conflict of
Laws: An Exercise in Judicial Method, 2 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 8; (1970); Sedler, The Governmental
Interest Ap.proach to Choice of Law: A.n Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 181
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Sedler 19771.
3 Peterson, Developments in American Conflict of Laws, Torts, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 289; Twerski,
Neumeier v. Kuehner Where are the Emperor's Clothes? 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 104 (1973) [herein-
after cited as Twerski HOFSTRA]; Twerski, To Where Does One Attach the Horses, 61 Ky. L.J. 393
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Twerski KENTUCKY]; von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law
Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 927 (1975). A leading exponent of Professor Currie's theory of
interest analysis has recently categorized the actual holdings of courts that have adopted interest
analysis and concludes that "not only do the courts of one state decide cases presenting the same
law-fact patterns the same way, even when different substantive laws are involved, but also the
courts of different states, with only limited exceptions, tend to decide cases presenting the same
law-fact patterns in the same way." Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law Versus Choice-of-Law Rules:
Judicial Method in Conflicts Tort Cases, 44 TENN. L. REV. 975, 981 (1977).
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
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and the scholars who owe allegiance to its methodology5 did not signal
a radical departure from the never-ending search for truth that has be-
come the hallmark of conflicts law. The almost theological cast to the
arguments and the fervor with which they are presented evidence that
conflicts law is a serious game of applied jurisprudence. 6 One is left
with the distinct impression that conflicts law is outside the mainstream
of American judicial thought. Instead of a wholesome, pragmatic ap-
proach to decisionmaking that is highly fact-sensitive, even the judicial
decisions read as philosophical manifestos in which the facts and the
conflicting law are secondary in importance.7 Ultimately, it is theory
that predominates.
For some time, the authors of this article have argued that it is
necessary to build conflicts law from the ground up-to develop the
rules and theory considering all of the factual nuances which pervade
interstate cases." The thesis of this article is that a large number of
conflict cases since Babcock v. Jackson9 have involved clashes, not be-
tween substantive rules of liability, 10 but between liability rules which
5 Reese, Chief Judge Fuldand Choice of Law, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 548 (1971); Reese, Choice of
Law- Rules or.Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 315 (1972); Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restate-
ment, Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 679 (1963); Rosenberg, Two Views On Kell v. Hender-
son: An Opinion for the New York Court of Appeals, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 459 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Rosenberg 1967]; Rosenberg, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 551, 641
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Rosenberg 1968]. Although Professors Reese and Rosenberg inject a
sense of pragmatism in their suggestions for the resolution of choice-of-law problems, it is evident
that their major concern stems from the unwieldiness of interest analysis as an effective method
for predicting and resolving choice-of-law problems. Indeed, they are willing to sacrifice a good
result to the goal of effective judicial administration. See Reese, The Kentucky Approach to Choice
ofLaw: A Critique, 61 Ky. L.J. 368 (1975); Rosenberg 1968, supra. The works of Professor
Cavers, D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-oF-LAW PROCESS (1965) and Professor Weintraub, R. WEIN-
TRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) are more difficult to characterize, but
the jurisprudential overtones clearly predominate.
6 Baade 1967, note 2 supra. See Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963
DUKE L.J. 1; Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 377 (1966); Sedler, Interstate Accidents and the Unprovided For Case: Reflections on
Neumeier v. Kuehner, I HOFSTRA L. REV. 125 (1973).
7 See Twerski, Book Review, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1052 n.38 (1976), suggesting the
reader compare Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279,240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963) with
Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969). It is apparent from
such a comparison that for all the supposed sensitivity of interest analysis to the factual nuances of
the case, it is only those facts which can be easily tied to certain preordained policy considerations
that are given attention. See Sedler, supra note 3, at 1032-40 for a demonstration as to how
interest analysis rules can be formulated. This is accomplished by narrowly focusing on predeter-
mined interests and isolated aspects of the fact pattern which bring these interests into being.
8 Twerski, note 7 supra; Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism and Professor Cavers-The Penn-
sylvania Method, 9 DuQ. L. REV. 373 (1971); Twerski KENTUCKY, note 3 supra.
9 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
10 The term "substantive" will be used to connote those liability rules that are designed to
regulate human conduct and to promote certain states of mind. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV.
693, 726 (1974).
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stem from concern that the judicial process is inadequate to the task of
arriving at truth." There has been a failure to examine some practical
and realistic methods of accommodating conflicting state policies' 2 be-
cause the judicial and scholarly inquiry into conflicts problems has
been so heavily oriented toward jurisprudence. By utilizing varying
standards of proof and shifting burdens of proof, courts could resolve
many conflicts problems by creating special multistate rules that signifi-
cantly advance the interests of the concerned jurisdictions.
A multistate rule is a rule created by the courts to resolve conflicts
by giving effect to the domestic interests of the contact states without
applying the domestic rule of either state. The multistate rule differs in
content from the domestic rule, but attempts to address the basic policy
11 These liability rules would not be labeled as procedural for the purposes of Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) or Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). Indeed, it is
difficult to characterize rules of liability which deny or sharply delimit substantive rights out of a
concern that the judicial process cannot adequately insure against fraud or collusion. In a sense,
these issues are procedural because they stem from a belief in the inadequacies of the judicial
process to assure a result that has integrity. On the other hand, these rules do not deal with the
management of litigation, but rather in foreclosing or sharply limiting litigable issues by affecting
substantive rights.
A host of conflict cases are grounded in the differing policies of states regarding the effective-
ness of the litigation process to arrive at truth. The cases usually pit a rule severely restricting or
limiting liability against a more liberal rule which permits litigation of the suspect issue. See, e.g.,
Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass. 1949) (heart balm statutes); Babcock v. Jackson, 12
N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963) (host-guest statutes); Intercontinental Plan-
ning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 372, 248 N.E.2d 576, 300 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1969) (statute of
frauds). But see George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904
(1964) (strict liability standard or negligence in products liability). There has been considerable
debate whether the shift to strict liability was primarily motivated by proof problems that ham-
pered the plaintiff. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436
(1944); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973). See also
Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintijs Conduct, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 267; Noel,
Defective Products Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, andAssumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L.
REV. 93 (1972); Twerski, The Use andAbuse of Comparative Negligence in Products Liability, 10
IND. L. REv. 797 (1977). To the extent that the negligence standard was abandoned for reasons
other than its inherent substantive validity, it reflects a change of substantive law stemming from
the inability of the judicial process to fairly present the negligence issue for decision. It should be
noted that in this instance the higher liability standard, ie., strict liability, represents a shift away
from a standard which at the litigation stage was considered unmanageable and nonlitigable by
one of the parties. See text accompanying notes 49-52 infra.
12 But see Trautman, The Relation Between American Choice of Law and Federal Common
Law, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 105 (1977); von Mehren, Special Substantive Rulesfor Multistate
Problems: Their Role and Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 HARV. L.
'REv. 347 (1974) [hereinafter cited as von Mehren 1974]; von Mehren, Choice of Law andthe Prob-
lem of Justice, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 27 (1977) [hereinafter cited as von Mehren 19771;
Weintraub, Beyond Dpe'age: 4 "New Rule" Approach to Choice of Law in Consumer Credit
Transactions and a Critique of the Territorial Application of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 25
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 16 (1974). The concept of a multistate rule as proposed by Professor
Trautman is substantially different than that presented in this article. Professor Trautman sug-
gests that courts should extend beyond resolving conflicts to seek solutions which reflect multiju-
risdictional or shared policies.
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concerns that motivated the adoption of the domestic rule. It seeks ac-
commodation with the rules of other concerned jurisdictions when such
an accommodation reflects sensitivity to a state's own real interests,
which have been subordinated in purely domestic litigation. By em-
ploying multistate rules, some of the thorniest choice-of-law
problems-those arising from such diverse issues as statute of frauds,
host-guest statutes, interspousal immunity, statutes of limitation, and
wrongful death limitations-might be resolved in a pragmatic fashion.
Theorists may be unhappy, but such multistate rules might enable
courts to return to the tradition of judging and resolving cases, rather
than slavishly following highly structured conflicts doctrine.
THE FALSE CONFLICT BETWEEN LIABILITY RULES
Breakdown of the Procedural-Substantive Dichotomy
Traditional teaching has characterized rules of law as either proce-
dural or substantive.' 3 In the era that preceded the policy-centered ap-
proach to choice-of-law problems, the procedural-substantive
dichotomy was often utilized as an escape mechanism to arrive at a
result that was consistent with sound interest analysis.14 The newer
teaching eschews the unprincipled categorization of problems and de-
mands that there be a balance struck between the need of the forum to
retain the integrity of its own mechanisms for the effective operation of
its courts and the impact of the foreign rule on the outcome of the law-
suit.1 5 The effect of utilizing this approach has been to delimit sharply
the number and scope of issues that can be properly identified as proce-
dural and to facilitate the application of true interest analysis to resolve
the real policy differences between conflicting rules.' 6
13 See generally Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955); Levy v. Stei-
ger, 233 Mass. 600, 124 N.E. 477 (1919); Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of
Law, 42 YALE L.J. 333 (1933); Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 HARv. L. REV. 153
(1944); Sedler, The Erie Outcome Test as a Guide to Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of
Laws, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 813 (1962).
14 Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9
N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). See generally Paulsen & Sovern, Public
Policy in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969 (1956).
15 Lorenzen, Comment: The Statute ofLimitations and the Conflict ofLaws, 28 YALE L.J. 492
(1919); Morgan, note 13 supra; Sedler, note 13 supra; R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 5, at 45-48. The
outcome-determinative approach would apply the procedural rules of the jurisdiction whose sub-
stantive law otherwise governs the case. A true interest analysis approach would examine each
procedural rule to determine whether a given state has an interest in having the rule applied. In
making the decision, a court would take into account the impact of such a ruling on the operation
of its own judicial machinery. See Note, An Interest Analysis Approach to the Selection of Statutes
of Limitation, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299 (1974) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.U. Note].
16 The recent trend toward true interest analysis which focuses directly on whether a state has
an interest in having its so-called "procedural" rule applied has much to recommend it. The logic
of dealing with a choice-of-law situation by defining the issues in conflict rather than seeking to tie
the "procedural" rule to the law of the state that otherwise governs is merely the completion of the
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Accommodating Policy Goals with Multistate Rules
There is a need to rethink the problem. Many of the issues that
have been treated as substantive conflict problems under interest analy-
process of weaning ourselves away from jurisdiction-selecting rules. Courts and commentators
have recognized that the "procedural" rule may have policy dimensions that need not necessarily
be tied to other substantive law questions in the case. See Dindo v. Whitney, 429 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.
.1970); Farrier v. May Dep't Stores Co., 357 F. Supp. 190 (D.D.C. 1973); Heavner v. Uniroyal, 63
NJ. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973); Marshall v. George M. Brewster & Son, Inc., 37 N.J. 176, 180 A.2d
129 (1962); Air Prods. & Chem., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414
(1973); D. CAVERS, supra note 5, at 40-42; N.Y.U. Note, note 15 supra. Thus, the courts appear
willing to apply d6peqage between the procedural and substantive issues. D6peqage has been
described as
a simple phenomenon; applying the rules of different states to determine different issues.
When a case presents more than one choice-of-law issue and each is analyzed separately,
situations arise in which it is claimed that the law of one state should govern one issue and
that of another a second. . . . As choice-of-law thinking has moved in the direction of ana-
lyzing each issue separately, the use of d6peqage has become much more widespread. But
what is not so common is to piece together the substantive rules of the relevant states to reach
a result that could not be reached if the domestic law of either state were applied to the entire
case.
R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE, & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 383 (2d ed. 1975).
It is not clear, however, that the aforementioned cases demonstrate a trend toward true inter-
est analysis. The leading case rejecting the lexfori rule for statute of limitation questions,
Heavner v. Uniroyal, 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973) did not suggest a clear preference for an
interest analysis which would examine the claims of the concerned jurisdictions for the application
of their respective statutes of limitation independent of the otherwise controlling substantive law.
Id. at 141, 305 A.2d at 418. In Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1192 (D.N.J.
1973), rev'd, 508 F.2d 28 (3d Cir. 1975), the court held that Reavner required that it perform an
interest analysis with regard to conflicting statutes of limitation. 366 F. Supp. at 1196-97 n.8. The
court explicitly eschewed choosing which state's substantive law would govern. Id. at 1200 n.12.
It was thus clear that an interest analysis would be undertaken on the statute of limitation issues
alone. In reversing, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that it could not
consider the statute of limitation issue in isolation since to do so would defeat the very purpose of
Heapner, which seeks to discourage forum shopping. 508 F.2d at 36. The court said that the
foreign state's policy of protecting the court and defendant from tardy litigation will never seem
relevant to a local court dealing with a defendant not domiciled in the foreign jurisdiction. Id. at
32 n.10. It thus intimated that the only methodology available to thwart rampant forum shopping
was to tie the statute of limitations to the substantive law which would otherwise govern the case.
For an effective rebuttal to this argument, see N.Y.U. Note, supra, note 15, at 314-16.
There does exist a class of cases in which it appears that the very best that courts can do is to
apply the law of the state whose substantive law governs the case. Those courts that have been
called upon to interpret borrowing statutes have been faced with a dilemma. The statutes call for
the application of the shorter statute of limitations of the state in which the cause of action "arose"
or "accrued." The question arises how the statutory language should be interpreted after a state
has adopted interest analysis. The terms "arose" and "accrued" were meaningful when First Re-
statement territorial concepts prevailed, but are decidedly out of step with modern interest analy-
sis. The better reasoned decisions have read interest analysis into the old statutory language. See
Hamilton v. General Motors Corp., 490 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1973); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Bendix-
Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co., 372 F.2d 18, 21 (3d Cir. 1966) (Freedman, J., dissent-
ing); O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 335 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Klondike Helicopters Ltd. v.
Fairchild-Hiller Corp., 334 F. Supp. 890 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Millhollin, InterestAnalysis and Conflicts
Between Statutes of Limitation, 27 HASTINGS L. REv. 1 (1975). Nonetheless, given the statutory
emphasis on the place where the cause of action arose or accrued, a court may not be free to
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sis do not lend themselves to easy categorization. A large number of
issues belong to a separate genre, encompassing rules of law that are far
more than housekeeping rules and thus deserve careful interest analy-
sis. Yet, when the origin of these rules is uncovered, it is clear that a
"deep false conflict" exists between the competing rules of the con-
cerned jurisdictions, for both states agree as to the proper substantive
law that should govern the case. When clear-cut substantive rules that
either deny or sharply limit a cause of action are based on the inability
of the courts to assure themselves that the parties and witnesses are not
involved in fraud, duress, collusion, or fabrication, then a method of
accommodation exists to further the policy goals of the rules in conflict.
By creating a multistate rule that raises or lowers the standard of proof
required to establish a case, courts can accommodate differing views.
This accommodation is possible because the underlying substantive
law is not in conflict; rather, the conflict lies in the method by which the
substantive rights may be established. Unlike other areas of substan-
tive law in which policy differences can be expressed only on an all-or-
nothing basis, the quantum of proof necessary to establish a case has an
accordion-like quality that can be tailored to fit the situation.
THE HOST-GUEST CONFLICTS
Traditional Interest Anaysis
The host-guest statutes have spawned more choice-of-law litiga-
tion than any other area of the law.17 They provided the backdrop for
the abandonment of rigid territorial doctrine in many states. The clas-
sic false conflict case that led the revolution was the New York Court of
Appeals decision in Babcock v. Jackson.'8 In that case, plaintiff and
defendant, both New York residents, embarked on a weekend trip to
Canada. The plaintiff was a guest-passenger in the defendant's auto-
mobile. The defendant lost control of his car while driving in the Prov-
ince of Ontario; it went off the highway into an adjacent stone wall, and
the plaintiff was seriously injured. At that time, Ontario had a statute
barring any action on behalf of a guest against a host.19 The object of
the statute was to prevent collusive actions between passengers and
drivers that could lead to fraudulent claims. New York, on the other
perform an interest analysis on the statute of limitation issue alone, but may be required to tie the
result to the substantive law which governs the case.
17 Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972); Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203
N.W.2d 408 (1973); Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64
(1972); Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969); Dym v.
Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d
473, 191 NE.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854
(1970); Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
18 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
19 Highway Traffic Act of Province of Ontario, ONT. REv. STAT. ch. 172, § 105 (2) (1960).
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hand, favored compensation to automobile accident victims and recog-
nized a cause of action based on common law negligence in host-guest
situations.
The New York court decided that this case presented only an ap-
parent conflict between the laws of the two jurisdictions. New York
had no reason to depart from its policy, which permitted recovery,
merely because an accident affecting its citizens happened to occur be-
yond its borders, and Ontario had no conceivable interest in denying a
remedy to a New York guest against his New York host for injuries
suffered in Ontario. The court held that the Ontario statute sought to
prevent fraudulent claims asserted against Ontario defendants and
their insurance carriers, not those asserted against New York defend-
ants and their insurance carriers. The court reasoned that where a New
York plaintiff imposed upon New York defendants or defrauded insur-
ers of New York defendants,20 Ontario had little legislative concern
simply because the accident occurred there.
In the decade that followed, the Babcock rationale was tested by a
series of cases, many with facts unlike the New York-dominated Bab-
cock situation.2' In these cases the issue was whether the policy analy-
sis expressed in Babcock would dominate or whether the courts would
acknowledge territorial considerations as significant in resolving
choice-of-law problems.22 In Neumeer v. Kuehner,23 the court was
forced to recognize the limitations of interest analysis and reckon with
territorial considerations too significant to ignore. The defendant in
Neumeier was a New York resident who traveled from Buffalo, New
20 For an excellent discussion of the legislative history behind the Ontario host-guest statute,
see Baade, The Case ofthe Disinterested Two States. Neumeier v. Kuelmer, I HOFSTRA L. REV.
150, 152-56 (1973).
21 Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972) (plaintiff-
Canadian resident, defendant-New York resident, site of accident-Canada); Tooker v. Lopez,
24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969) (plaintiff-New York resident, defend-
ant-New York resident, site of accident-Michigan); Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d
877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968) (plaintiff-New York resident, defendant-Maine resident, site of
accident-Maine); Farber v. Smolack, 20 N.Y.2d 198, 229 N.E.2d 36, 282 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967)
(plaintiff-New York resident, defendant-New York resident, site of accident-North Carolina);
Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966) (plaintiff-New York
resident, defendant-New York resident, site of accident-Canada); Long v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965) (plaintiff-Penn-
sylvania resident, defendant-New York resident, site of accident-Maryland); Dym v. Gordon,
16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965) (plaintiff-New York resident, defend-
ant-New York resident, site of accident-Colorado); Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d I 1l,
204 N.E.2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965) (plaintiff-New York resident, defendant-Connecticut
resident, site of accident-Puerto Rico).
22 This conflict became especially clear in the split between the majority and dissent in Dym v.
Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 129, 209 N.E.2d 792, 797, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463, 470 (1965) and Tooker v.
Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 592, 249 N.E.2d 394, 408, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 539 (1969). See D. CAVERs,
sufpra note 5, at 293-311 app.; von Mehren, supra note 3, at 948-52.
23 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
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York to Ontario, Canada. He picked up his guest, Neumeier, an Onta-
rio resident, in Ontario. The defendant's car was struck by a train at a
railroad crossing in Ontario, and both the host and his guest-passenger
were killed.
This simple fact pattern, superimposed on the legal positions of
New York and Ontario as to host-guest liability, presents an anomalous
situation. New York has no host-guest statute; Ontario, on the other
hand, requires a guest to prove gross negligence against a host in order
to recover. Under traditional interest analysis, to determine whether
there is a true policy conflict, the policies supporting the supposedly
conflicting rules must be examined. This analysis would lead a court to
conclude that New York's policy favoring compensation is not rele-
vant. Since New York is concerned primarily with the welfare of its
domiciliaries and the plaintiff is an Ontario resident, New York has no
stake or interest in whether the plaintiff recovers. But neither is the
Ontario host-guest statute relevant. Since the Ontario host-guest stat-
ute is designed to protect Ontario domiciliaries or insurance companies
doing business in Ontario from host-guest collusion, Ontario clearly
has no strong reason to apply the statute for the benefit of a New York
defendant.24
The late Professor Brainerd Currie, when faced with this kind of
dilemma, was quite direct as to its implication. He said: "This is the
'unprovided for case' in a very special sense. Neither state cares what
happens."25 Realizing that this statement was somewhat shocking,
Currie defended his position.
It may be that the laws of neither state, nor of both states together, pur-
port to dispose of the entire universe of possible cases. Identical laws do
not necessarily mean identical policies, when it is remembered that the
scope of policy is limited by the legitimate interests of the respective
states.26
Devotees of interest analysis were troubled by the inability of con-
flicts jurisprudence to provide available law to decide a simple inter-
state automobile accident case.27 They argued that the courts had
24 The Neumeier court applied Ontario law, however. The court adopted a compromise rule
that Chief Judge Fuld had formulated in a previous concurring opinion:
Normally, the applicable rule of decision will be that of the state where the accident occurred
but not if it can be shown that displacing that normally applicable rule will advance the
relevant substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multi-state
system or producing great uncertainty for litigants.
Id. at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 460, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70 (quoting Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 585,
249 N.E.2d 394, 404, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 532 (1969) (Fuld, C.J., concurring)). The Neumneer court
found that the plaintiff had failed to offer evidence sufficient to displace the general rule.
25 B. CURRiE, supra note 2, at 128. See also Baade 1969, supra note 2, at 30, where the author
labels this phenomenon the "no policy" case or "the case where a sensible result could only be
obtained by altruistic interests analysis."
26 B. CuRRE, supra note 2, at 153.
27 Sedler, Interstate Accidents and the Unprovided For Case.- RqJections on Neumeier v.
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overlooked a common policy that exists as a substratum to resolve this
very kind of case. They posited that all states have a common policy to
provide compensation to the victims of auto accidents at the hands of
negligent drivers. Host-guest statutes are limited exceptions to the nor-
mal compensatory policy. In a case like Neumeier, both New York and
Ontario are viewed as having a common policy of compensating plain-
tiffs for ordinary negligence. Ontario, however, recognizes an excep-
tion to this policy for the purpose of protecting Ontario insurers or
domiciliaries. Since the defendant and the insurer are from New York,
the Ontario exception does not apply; the common policy of compensa-
tion therefore surfaces and controls the outcome of the case.
For all the ingenuity that this approach offers, it has a basic flaw.
If there is an underlying policy that favors the compensation of plain-
tiffs for injuries done them by negligent defendants, it appears that
New York and Ontario have parted ways regarding whether a guest
should be able to recover from a host for ordinary negligence. Al-
though the common policy approach may have much to recommend it
when viewed in the context of the interplay between shared domestic
and interstate policies, the authors find the approach to be inadequate
from the perspective of parochial domestic interests.28
Subordinating Individualized Justice
An inquiry into the interest of any state in applying a host-guest
rule in a totally domestic situation is in order. Can it be said that a
state seeks to accomplish "justice" or the "right result" by applying its
host-guest statute to each and every case before the courts? Ontario
would not seem to endorse such an overreaching expression of statu-
tory purpose. A more modest, honest formulation of its policy is that
its concern that collusion between the parties will occur in a significant
percentage of host-guest cases has led it to bar all such actions within
the state. Although this total bar may be statistically justified, the rule
Kuehner, I HOFSTRA L. REv. 125 (1973); Sedler, Weintraub's Commentary on the Conflict fLaws:
The Chapter on Torts, 57 IowA L. REV. 1229 (1972). See also R. CRAOTON, D. CURIE, & H.
KAY, supra note 16, at 283.
28 Twerski, HOFSTRA, supra note 3, at 109. The common policy approach is based on a belief
that, if we gave full play to parochial domestic interests, both concerned jurisdictions would agree
that in a Neumeler fact situation the compensation policy would govern since there is no relevant
policy to protect insurance companies from fraud at defendant's domicile. The upshot of this
approach is that a state's antifraud policy is considered irrelevant to an accident which occurs
within the plaintiffs home state. The notion that an antifraud policy is only to protect the defend-
ant and does not seek to deter both parties from engaging in fraud seems strange and somewhat
forced. In his excellent analysis of Neumeier, Professor Trautman acknowledges that the "anti-
ingrate" policy, which is offered as a rationale to support host-guest legislation, may be two-sided.
It may protect hosts against ungrateful guests and may seek to deny recovery to ungrateful guests.
Trautman, Rule or Reason in Choice-of-Law: A Comment on Neumeier, 1 VT. L. REv. 1, 6-7
(1976). Yet, in describing the possible impact of host-guest statutes, he finds the anticollusion
principle as only protecting the defendant.
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does not always accomplish justice in individual cases.29 It is not a
finely tuned instrument. It has all the subtlety of a meat axe.
In instances where the choice-of-law question centers around legal
prescriptions based upon "statistical justice" rather than "individual
justice," the concept of interest analysis cannot move easily from the
general prescription to the individual case. This problem is even more
acute when the interest analysis is focused upon narrow and parochial
domestic interests.30 If, for example, compensation or protection from
fraud is identified as the only relevant state interest, it strains credulity
to suggest that the state's rule, which is structured to accomplish these
goals over the statistical sample, must be applied in a choice-of-law
setting. Indeed, it does little good to ask whether the state's interest
would be furthered by the application of its rule to a multistate situa-
tion. The question is illegitimate since, even in a purely domestic situa-
tion, the state has subordinated "individualized justice" to larger
overall policy considerations.
Liability Rules in Conflict-The True Dilemma
At this juncture we are faced with a true dilemma. If we ask
whether the mixed fact situation was part of the overall sample of cases
that led the legislature or the court to establish its general rule and thus
is covered by that general rule, the answer will usually be clear. The
mixed fact situation is rarely contemplated by legislators or judges; it is
usually faced only after the fact. At times, the extraterritorial scope of
the law is rather clearly defined, but this is the exception rather than
the rule.31 What we are faced with in this type of conflicts case, be it a
"true" or a "false" conflict, is a situation where two or more states have
created statistically based rules that do not necessarily address the for-
eign case and cannot be counted on, even if the case is purely domestic,
to accomplish "individualized justice" or to maximize the state's "inter-
est" in the particular case. The only way to articulate the state interest
in this type of case is to say that in a large number of cases the rule will
accomplish a just result over time and that justice in the individual case
29 Indeed, even at the domestic level several courts have found that the host-guest statutes
create irrational classifications, thus violating the equal protection clause. See Brown v. Merlo, 8
Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973) (finding the California guest statute unconsti-
tutional under both federal and state law); Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 362 (1974)
(finding the Kansas guest statute unconstitutional under both federal and state law). See text and
cases cited in Sidle v. Majors, 429 U.S. 945, 946-47 n.2 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari), for a general review of the controversy over the constitutionality of guest statutes.
30 See B. CURRIE, note 2 supra; Sedler 1977, note 2 supra. For those commentators who take
into account a broader range of domestic and interstate goals in defining state interests, the prob-
lem raised in the text is of less moment. See von Mehren, note 3 supra; Trautman, note 12 supra.
31 R. CRAMToN, D. CURRIE, & H. KAY, supra note 16, at 178-94. Examples of statutory
solutions to multistate legal problems can be found in the Uniform Commercial Code, no-fault
insurance statutes, borrowing statutes, and the Uniform Probate Code.
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may have to suffer in order to further some other policy goal. There
can be, however, no pretense about the rule making good law or good
sense in the individual case. Although the policy reasons for broad
rulemaking, which exclude taking into account the particularized fac-
tors of individual cases, do in a sense accrue to the whole body politic
of the state, and thus to the individual who suffers the sting of the over-
broad rule, the statistically based rule does not bring the state's interest
into play at a level that demands its application in a choice-of-law set-
ting.
This mode of analysis can lead to some rather unsettling observa-
tions. If, as has been posited, a state eschews an interest in accomplish-
ing justice in each and every host-guest case by applying the preclusive
rule, but instead adopts a rule that will foster such interests as honesty
and witness integrity over a long period of time in domestic cases, the
claim for application of the rule in the conflicts theater on the basis of
state interest is suspect. In the infrequent and highly individual fact
situation of a host-guest conflicts case, it is questionable that state pol-
icy will be furthered by denial of a cause of action to the injured plain-
tiff. Courts are not unaccustomed to dealing with the possibility of
fraud and, in any one case, will not be overly burdened should such a
possibility be present. It is a multiplicity of such cases that the domes-
tic immunity rule seeks to avoid. Furthermore, to the extent that the
antifraud rule seeks to foster morality, that is well accomplished by its
application in the domestic setting. Thus, if it does not further the
state's interest to preclude a cause of action in an individual case when
other methods are available to discover fraud, and no flood of similar
cases can be anticipated, it might be beneficial to the state to allow the
cause of action, even though a similar domestic fact pattern would be
barred.32
32 It may be questioned why the authors seek to formulate a multistate rule to resolve the host-
guest problem. If, as we have argued, the statistically based rule is not necessarily applicable in a
choice-of-law setting, we should be prepared to fall back on normal compensatory policies. In-
deed, it has been strongly argued that courts should perceive themselves as exercising national
authority in choice-of-law cases. To formulate this multistate law, courts would consider the fact
that host-guest laws represent obsolescent policies and that they are contrary to strong compensa-
tory policies that are the multistate norm. Trautman, Supra note 12, at 115-16.
The argument presented in the text, that rules of statistical justice indicate a diminished state
interest in the case at bar, could be viewed as an additional reason for not insisting on the promo-
tion of domestic interests. It thus might be argued that there is no need to utilize the kind of
multistate substantive rule which raises the standard of proof and accommodates the interests of
both jurisdictions. It is the position of the authors, however, that there is good reason to use a
multistate rule in a high percentage of host-guest cases. As is noted later, the authors' territorialist
bias leads to the conclusion that a "true conflict" exists in such cases as Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31
N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972) and Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 394, 249
N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969). The need for a multistate rule to resolve choice-of-law
problems is a function of how significant the conflicts problem is, given the choice-of-law prefer-
ence. See text accompanying notes 45-56 infra.
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Once freed from the tyranny of domestic interest analysis in host-
guest cases, 33 an accommodation between apparently conflicting rules
can be sought. One state's rule allowing recovery and the rule of an-
other state barring a cause of action may be based on similar premises,
the only difference being the conclusion each state has reached in
resolving its internal policy. Assuming that a host-guest case does pre-
sent a particularly good opportunity for fraud and collusion, then New
York, as an enlightened jurisdiction, must share Ontario's concern over
the possibility of unjust recoveries. That New York has resolved the
problem in favor of the ordinary negligence rule does not, however,
lessen the threat of collusion; the courts have merely subordinated that
concern at a domestic level in favor of compensation. New York, like
Ontario, has made a judgment based on statistical justice.34
33 In one sense, the two thoughts presented in the text stand independently. One could argue
for the utilization of a multistate rule which resolves the clash between the two conflicting host-
guest rules without giving credence to the concept that rules which are statistically based do not
speak to individual cases. The authors tie the two together, believing that the adherents of state
interest analysis will be more receptive to multistate rules if it can be demonstrated that the inter-
ests supposedly fostered by the statistically based rules have a weak claim to application in a
choice-of-law setting.
34 Professor Currie has touched upon the question whether a policy that has been
subordinated has continued viability for choice-of-law purposes. B. CURRIE, supra note 2, at 158
n.86. He suggests that, in some instances, whether the subordinated policy is viable may have
constitutional ramifications. In his discussion of equal protection, Professor Currie questions
whether a state may justify classifications made on the basis of a nonresident's home law. Id. at
526. In general, he concludes that a state may refuse the beneficence of its law to a nonresident if
the nonresident's domiciliary law is less generous than that of the forum.
Professor Currie then confronts a difficult question. Dealing with a hypothetical variant of
Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953), he asks:
What of the situation in which an Arizona plaintiff brings his action in California against the
administrator of the deceased California tortfeasor? Rather plainly, for California to deny
the benefit of its survival statute to non-residents generally would be a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause (or the Privileges and Immunities Clause). Would it be permissible to
grant that benefit or deny it according to whether the law of the state where the plaintiff
resides also provides for survival?
B. CURRIE, supra note 2, at 571. Professor Currie concludes that differential treatment of nonresi-
dents on the basis of their domiciliary laws cannot be justified unless the law of the forum ex-
presses two policies, one of which sustains the judgment against the nonfavored defendant. He
reasons:
[i]n a superficial way, it might be said that California has an "interest" in protecting the
estates of local decedents against tort liability, subject to an overriding exception in favor of
securing compensation for local victims. But an interest is the product of the application of
legal policy to a state of facts; and it is questionable whether California can be said to have
retained a policy of protecting the estates of decedents against liability for their torts in any
situation. If not, California can have no interest in their protection, and there is no California
law in existence to preclude recovery by any nonresident. Because we could not discern in
California law any residual policy for the protection of decedents' estates we have previously
expressed the opinion that a classification of nonresident plaintiffs according to their domicil-
iary laws in order to determine their right to sue California estates would be not so much a
differential treatment in good faith of persons differently situated as a mere attempt to pre-
clude recovery by as many foreigners as possible.
Id.
Under the analysis suggested in this article, a court would not quickly conclude that a
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Resolving the Interstate Problem-The Multistate Rule
If the above arguments ring true, then there appears to be a prag-
matic method of resolving the interstate problem. When a choice-of-
law case raises a question as to the extraterritorial reach of the host-
guest statute, the courts should address not only the operative policies
of both states, 35 but also those domestic policies that have been set
aside in favor of the statistical rule. The latter can be specifically ad-
dressed once the court has broken free from the shackles imposed by
the nondiscriminating domestic rule. For example, in a case where the
clash is between a host-guest rule requiring proof of gross negligence
and the common law rule permitting recovery based on ordinary negli-
gence, the courts could allow recovery by permitting liability to be
proven if ordinary negligence is established, but require that the evi-
dentiary burden be that normally imposed in fraud cases, ie., "clear
and convincing evidence." This would foster not only the shared inter-
ests of both states in preventing fraud and collusion and permitting
legitimate recoveries, but would allow also for judicial control of those
cases that were made suspect by use of the directed verdict. This Solo-
mon-like compromise may be viewed as unconscionable in some
quarters.36 The suggested resolution is, however, not unprincipled. It
is not even a compromise. By applying the multistate rule to a case in
which, admittedly, a state cannot assure itself that justice will be done,
subordinated policy is so devoid of merit that it disappears from the corpus juris of the state. For
example, it might be argued that ifhost-guest or interspousal immunity is abolished, then the state
has decided to hold the host or spouse equal to any other defendant. See Cavers, Comments on
Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 647, 653 (1968). That does not mean, however, that the
state is no longer concerned with possible fraud or collusion. If, in a choice-of-law situation, that
concern is brought forward because of multistate facts, a court could fashion a remedy which gives
some recognition to the concern of a sister state that such litigation is susceptible to fraud and
collusion. For an interesting discussion of the issue of subordination, see von Mehren, supra note
3, at 936-38.
It should be noted that even courts that have found the host-guest statutes to be unconstitu-
tional have not held that the fear of collusion is unwarranted. Rather, the grounds for striking
down the statutes have been their overbreadth. The court in Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 761-
62, 518 P.2d 362, 370 (1974), makes this clear.
In Brown the Supreme Court of California effectively refuted the "collusion" argument by
pointing out that under the terms of the guest statute the rider and driver can escape the
statute's bar and thwart the "anti-collusion" purpose, simply by colluding on the issue of
whether the rider provided any compensation or payment for the ride. By broadly prohibit-
ing all automobile guests from instituting causes of action for negligence because a small
segment of that class may file collusive suits, the guest statute creates an overinclusive classifi-
cation scheme. It results as throwing out the baby simply because the bath water gets dirty
once in a while. The statutory scheme clearly imposes a burden upon a wider range of indi-
viduals than are included in the class of those tainted with the mischief at which the law aims.
We believe that in barring suits for all automobile guests simply to protect insurance compa-
nies from some collusive lawsuits, the guest statute exceeds the bounds of rationality and
constitutes a denial of equal protection of the law.
35 See A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 215-327
(1965); Trautman, supra note 28, at 16-20.
36 B. CURRIE, note 2 supra.
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even in a totally domestic setting, each state receives a full loaf by giv-
ing effect to its primary goal and the normally subordinated goal.
Since the mixed fact situation case is not directly addressed by the sta-
tistically based rule, the state is free to inquire whether, in a case that is
not governed by that rule, it can fashion a solution that maximizes both
conflicting policies.37 That the impetus to do so is occasioned by the
rather strong feelings of another jurisdiction as to the problem ought
not to make the process suspect. If, in addition to a good domestic
result, the court accomplishes a diplomatic coup by not ignoring the
competing concerns of a sister state, that is occasion for jubilation,
since good domestic analysis has been merged with diplomacy in
choice-of-law.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
In analyzing the role of the statute of frauds in a choice-of-law
setting, one must determine the goals to be furthered by enforcement of
the requirement of a written contract. An immediate consideration is
the "planning" aspect that inheres in most contractual arrangements-
whether application of the statute of frauds promotes planning and dis-
courages reliance by others on oral promises. There is a general lack of
solicitude for the party who has not committed the contract to writing
as some foresight would have eliminated the problem in its entirety.
But the parties who enter into oral contracts often lack the sophistica-
tion of good planners, and it is perhaps unrealistic to hope, even in a
purely domestic setting, that enforcement of the writing requirement
will cause others to contract with greater forethought regarding poten-
tial contract problems. In a choice-of-law setting, the likelihood that
planning will be promoted through application of the statute of frauds
becomes even more remote. The ability of the layman to appreciate the
subtleties of the multistate setting are such that "planning" cannot be
viewed as a realistic goal to be furthered by the enforcement of the
writing requirement. Thus, the statute of frauds must be evaluated for
choice-of-law purposes on the basis of its success in achieving the goals
37 The suggestion that a state utilize a multistate rule to give effect to both its dominant and
subordinated policies is similar to the d~pegage concept in which a result is attained in a choice-
of-law setting which would not be reached if the domestic law of either state were applied to the
entire case. See Reese, Depeqage: .4 Common Phenomenon in Choice-of-Law, 73 COLUM. L. REv.
58 (1973). It differs from classical d6pe age in that in evaluating the need for the formulation of
such a rule, a state must perform an internal d6pegage with regard to an issue to which its domes-
tic rule has a resolution. By recognizing that the domestic rule itself required the subordination of
other policy interests, it seeks to give effect to those interests when they are consistent with the
interests of another concerned jurisdiction. The domestic rule thus becomes a source of policy,
but not a straitjacket which prevents creative rulemaking in a multistate setting. For a similar line
of analysis, see also Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962); Trautman,
5upra note 12, at 122-24.
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of fraud and perjury prevention. 38
The Needfor an Evidenifary Compromise
If one focuses directly on the fraud prevention policy of the statute
of frauds, it is clear that the statute is not finely tuned to the equities of
the individual case. It is, in the parlance utilized earlier, a rule of statis-
tical justice. There is no pretense that "justice will be done" in any
given case. Indeed, much fraud is fostered by the statute of frauds it-
self.39 All that can be said in its defense is that it is necessary to sacri-
fice individual meritorious cases for the benefit of a rule that cuts
broadside.
The conflicts case, as noted earlier, demands under modem policy
analysis an exacting examination of the facts in the individual case to
determine whether one rule has claim to application by virtue of some
state interest. This mode of examination itself becomes suspect, how-
ever, if the rule being examined does not purport to further the state
interest in any particular fact setting. If it appears from the facts that
states with conflicting policies may each have a legitimate claim to the
application of their rule on the statute of frauds issue, an evidentiary
compromise will further the interests of both states. If the rule in such
a conflicts case would be that the contract may be proven by utilizing
an evidentiary standard of "clear and convincing evidence, 40 then the
interests of both states would be substantially furthered. The state that
38 See J. MURRAY, CONTRACTS § 312 (1974); 3 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 448 (1960 &
Supp. 1979). The preamble to the original Statute of Frauds (enacted by the English Parliament
in 1677) stated the purpose: "for prevention of many fraudulent practices which are commonly
endeavoured to be upheld by perjury and subornation of perjury." Rabel, The Statute ofFrauds
and Comparative LegalHistory, 63 LAW Q. REV. 174, 175 (1947). Other reasons have been postu-
lated, including the promotion of deliberation, certainty of terms, and proof of volition. Id. In all
such cases, however, the statute is prophylactic, and it is unlikely that any state interests are pro-
moted by application of the statute to the infrequent conflicts case. See also Cavers, Oral Con-
tracts to Provide by Will and the Choice of Law Process: Some Notes on Bernkrant, in
PERSPECTIVES OF LAw-EsSAYS FOR AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCoTr 60 (1964) (suggests that the statute
of frauds may be designed not only to prevent frauds and perjury after a testator's death but also
to discourage individuals from making plans on the strength of oral promises). In suggesting that
the only appropriate considerations in a choice-of-law setting are the deterrence of fraud and
perjury, the authors imply that the prophylactic role which Professor Cavers suggests seems un-
realistic. The planning aspect which would deny the enforcement of a contract so that others
would be discouraged from relying on oral promises seems remote. See Twerski, Choice-of-Law in
Contracts--Some Thoughts on the Weintraub 4pproach, 57 IowA L. REV. 1239 (1972).
39 Those critical of the statute of frauds have suggested that it "perpetrates more injustice than
it prevents. 2 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 275 (1950). See also 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note
38, at §§ 448 n.7, 449. For review and discussion of such criticism, see Yonge, The Unheralded
Demise of the Statute ofFrauds Welsher in Oral Contracts For the Sale of Goods and Investment
Securities: Oral Sales Contracts are Enforceable by Involuntary Admissions in Court Under U C C.
Sections 2-201(3)(b) and 8-319(d), 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 4-5 nn.23 & 24 (1976).
40 C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 340 (2d ed. 1972). Certain jurisdictions have applied the
"clear and convincing" standard to prove an oral contract to make a will. Hill v. Talbert, 210 Ark.
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espouses the statute of frauds rule would be assured that the contract
would not be enforced unless exacting standards of proof were met.
The state that enforces oral contracts without special safeguards would,
in this instance, allow special attention to be focused on a concern
(fraud) that is somewhat subordinated in most domestic litigation. The
factual development of the issue cannot be avoided since, if fraud is an
issue, it will be litigated in any event. The only question is whether the
standard of proof will be that which ordinarily prevails in an ordinary
contracts case. This accommodation to another state's legitimate con-
cern is a modest one at best. But it may not be even that. If the prem-
ise is that the application of a rule of statistical justice has little bearing
in a conflicts setting, then a state may simply be adjusting its domestic
rule for a fact pattern in order to address an interest subordinated in
most domestic litigation.41
An illustration of the operation of such a multistate conflicts rule
and how its adoption would avoid the sophistry of exaggerated interest
analysis is provided by Intercontinental Planning, Ltd v. Daystrom.42
In this case, the court had to decide whether to apply the New York
Statute of Frauds, which requires brokerage contracts to be in writing,
against a New York plaintiff-broker. The defendant, a New Jersey cor-
poration, could not seek the protection of the New Jersey Statute of
Frauds since the statute did not require brokerage contracts to be in
writing. New York might have had an interest in enforcing the oral
contract, but its Statute of Frauds would deny enforcement. The New
Jersey law, on the other hand, would permit enforcement of the con-
tract, but New Jersey had no compelling reason to do so since plaintiff
was not a domiciliary of New Jersey. Thus, neither state had any com-
pelling interest either in enforcing or in not enforcing the contract. The
traditional argument in such circumstances would be that both states
have a subsidiary goal of enforcing contracts and that New York's ex-
ception to that goal is not applicable since the defendant is not a New
York domiciliary.
The New York Court of Appeals did not, however, follow tradi-
tional analysis in Daystrom. It reasoned that New York had an interest
in attracting business to the state, since New York is the commercial
center of the United States. Thus, the state wanted businessmen to
know that New York does not enforce oral brokerage contracts. The
866, 869, 197 S.W.2d 942, 943 (1946); Jensen v. Housley, 207 Ark. 742, 745, 182 S.W.2d 758, 759
(1944); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Busch, 346 Mo. 1237, 1244-45, 145 S.W.2d 426, 430 (1940).
41 This mode of analysis is not unlike that suggested by Professor Trautman in his discussion
of Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961). See Trautman,
supra note 12, at 107 (suggesting that the court in Bernkrant indicated that it was totally con-
vinced that the promise was in fact made). It should be noted that even in purely domestic litiga-
tion, some courts have permitted proof of the underlying transaction in the face of the statute of
frauds in order to remedy an injustice. See 1 A. ScoTr, TRUSTS § 44 (1967).
42 24 N.Y.2d 372, 248 N.E.2d 576, 300 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1969).
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court completed its tour deforce by finding that New Jersey would
have no opposing interest if New York gave protection to New Jersey
corporations against New York plaintiffs. This kind of interest manip-
ulation is highly questionable. Both New Jersey and New York were
sufficiently involved to bring their policies on enforcement of broker-
age contracts into play.43 Instead of engaging in the all-or-nothing ap-
proach of interest analysis, which required interest manipulation, it
would have been better for the court to apply a multistate substantive
rule that would have permitted the enforcement of the contract upon
proof of its existence and terms by clear and convincing evidence.
Whether this exacting standard is met may be somewhat affected by the
bias of the judiciary to issues raised under the statute of frauds. Never-
theless, applying the higher standard of proof would allow for the poli-
cies of both concerned states to find expression in a conflicts setting.44
43 The court listed the territorial contacts in the following manner:
It is clear that the instant dispute has sufficient contacts with New York to give our State a
substantial interest in applying its policy. Plaintiff is a New York Corporation and its in-
ternational finder's business centers in this State. Moreover, plaintiff's representation of
Rochar derived from a New York meeting with Rochar's president. Plaintiff solicited Day-
strom's interest in Rochar through an advertisement placed in a New York newspaper, and
Mr. Jacob introduced the presidents of the two original principals (Rochar and Daystrom) at
a meeting in a New York restaurant. At this New York meeting the principals agreed to
compensate plaintiff with a finder's fee if a business relationship was concluded between
Rochar and Daystrom. The remaining contacts leading up to the execution of the written
finder's fee agreement involve letters and telephone calls emanating from plaintiffs New
York office and the New Jersey office of Daystrom. It is therefore clear that the services for
which plaintiff claims compensation were substantially rendered in New York and that our
State has a substantial relationship with the formation and negotiation of the finder's fee
agreement.
Id. at 384, 248 N.E.2d at 583, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
44 As noted at the outset, choice-of-law cases involving such issues as interspousal immunity,
statutes of limitations, and wrongful death limitations lend themselves to a similar method of
analysis. In large part, the disabilities which these issues impose on the plaintiffs right to recover
stem from the concern that the judicial process is not adequate to the task of arriving at the truth.
Thus, interspousal immunity is supported by the twin rationale of "collusion" and "protection of
family harmony." See Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 32, 216 A.2d 781, 783 (1966); Thompson
v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 88, 193 A.2d. 439, 440 (1963); McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 95,
215 A.2d 677, 682 (1966); Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co. 38 Wis. 2d 98, 112, 156 N.W.2d
466, 472 (1969); W. PROSSER, ToRTs § 122 (4th ed. 1971); R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 5, at 1. The
substitution of a multistate rule that imposes a higher standard of proof could mute the collusion
argument. As a result, a court might not feel bound to impose the "family harmony" reasoning in
a multistate situation.
Statutes of limitations give voice to several legitimate state concerns. First, there is a concern
that passage of time renders evidence uncertain and "stale"; memories become cloudy and less
reliable, witnesses die, and documentary evidence is lost. See, e.g., Order of R.R. Telegraphers v.
Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944); Davis v. Munie, 235 Ill. 620, 621-22, 85
N.E. 943, 944 (1908). Second, the time bar signals to the defendant that his or her time for "final
repose" has arrived vis-a-vis the transaction. See M'Cluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270, 277
(1830); Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950).
The "stale evidence" rationale goes to the ability of the judicial process to fairly adjudicate the
case. In a choice-of-law setting, a multistate substantive rule which sets a higher evidentiary stan-
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A CRITICAL LOOK AT VON MEHREN'S MULTISTATE SUBSTANTIVE
RULES
The argument that multistate substantive rules should be viewed
as an alternative to the all-or-nothing choice between competing do-
mestic rules was forcefully made by Professor von Mehren.45 In a pro-
vocative comment, von Mehren presented the following hypothetical:
A dog owned by a resident of State A strays into State B where it
bites a resident of State B. Under the domestic law of State B the owner
of a dog is strictly liable to a person bitten by the animal for damages
inflicted. Under the law of State A the owner is not liable unless he knew
that the dog had a propensity to bite. Assuming that State B's rule ex-
presses, inter alia, a compensation policy while the rule of State A is
designed to limit the risks attached to dog ownership, a true conflict is
presented; both policies are clearly applicable to the situation. In the cir-
cumstances, certain choice-of-law theories deny all recovery, while others
allow it. A third possibility, however, is to apply both states' rules, com-
promising differences on the basis of the relative strength of each legal
order's claim to regulate. In the circumstance under discussion, this ap-
proach might result in the plaintiffs recovering one-half of his actual
damages. The multi-state rule proposed, unlike a domestic-rule solution,
dard for the jury could mitigate this as a point of conflict. Given the uncertain nature of expectan-
cies in a complex multistate case, it may be that the "repose" rationale would be less significant.
Similarly, wrongful death limitations appear to be at least partially motivated by the fear of
speculative verdicts. A Pennsylvania court labeled this concern as procedural. Griffith v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d. 796 (1964). The court held that Colorado's wrongful death
limit should not be applied to a Pennsylvanian killed in a Colorado air crash when the case was to
be litigated in Pennsylvania. The court said:
An examination of the policies which apparently underlie that Colorado statute tends to
indicate that state's lack of interest in the amount of recovery in a Pennsylvania court. The
limitation would seem to have been intended to prevent Colorado courts from engaging in
what they might consider speculative computation of expected earnings and the extremely
difficult mathematical reduction to present worth. The statute may be based on procedural
considerations of purely local concern. Colorado would be unconcerned if a Pennsylvania
forum is willing to engage in such computations. Or, the limitation might have been intended
to protect Colorado defendants from large verdicts against them. Although United obviously
does some business in Colorado, it is not domiciled there. Furthermore, it does business in
and flies over other states, including Pennsylvania, which do not limit recovery. Certainly,
United could reasonably anticipate that it might be subject to the laws of such states and
could financially protect itself against such eventuality. The element of surprise is lacking.
Id. at 24, 203 A.2d at 807. The characterization of the Colorado wrongful death rule, which is
designed to discourage speculative computation of expected earnings, as procedural is unfortu-
nate. It really goes to the ability of the judicial process to fairly adjudicate this type of claim. If in
fact that is the concern, then tighter control of the evidence and a higher standard of proof might
substantially alleviate the concerns of Colorado in wrongful death cases. It is not the authors'
intent to provide a legal mechanism for resolving the problem of speculative verdicts; rather, the
purpose is to suggest the utilization of a multistate rule that would remove one of the potential
sources of conflict from a choice-of-law case.
45 Professor von Mehren attributes original thinking along this line to George Hoff. Von
Mehren 1974, supra note 12, at 366 n.63 (citing Hoff, Adjutments of Conflicting Rights: A Sug-
gested Substitute for the Method of Choice-of-Laws, 38 VA. L. REv. 745 (1952)).
Choice-of-Law Problems
thus recognizes that both states have legitimate interests in the situation.4 6
Von Mehren's solution, to "split the infant," does not appear to the
authors to foster the interests of either jurisdiction. It does not address
the policy goals that the conflicting rules seek to accomplish. It is possi-
ble, however, to create a multistate substantive rule that could signifi-
cantly advance the goals of both jurisdictions.
The conflicting rules in the dog-bite case pit a strict liability stan-
dard against one of ordinary negligence. The imposition of strict liabil-
ity may reflect a shift toward a new standard of liability in which fault
is not relevant. Recent developments in the law of products liability,
however, tend to indicate that the shift from negligence toward a strict
liability standard was motivated by a concern that plaintiffs were being
forced to carry the burden of proof on issues where control of the cru-
cial evidence was in the hands of the defendant.47 A possible resolu-
tion of this problem would be to shift to the defendant the burden of
proving that he was not negligent. It is arguable that, in practice, the
strict liability rule does just that.48 But even if a new standard of liabil-
ity has been adopted, the impetus for change may have been proof-
oriented.
The dog-bite case may be an occasion for creating a multistate rule
that shifts the burden of proof on the negligence issue to the defendant.
If the strict liability rule was motivated by the need to free the dog-bite
victim from proving the defendant's state of knowledge as to the dan-
gerous propensities of his dog, 49 then to retain the negligence rule with
a formal shifting of burden of proof is an acceptable multistate solution
to the conflict. The negligence rule of state A is fostered by retention of
the liability standard, yet the desire of state B that the plaintiff not be
46 Id. at 366.
47 Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product Liability
Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 297, 301 n.16 (citing Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d
622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973)). There, the court argued for strict liability, stating, "In today's
world it is often only the manufacturer who can fairly be said to know and to understand when an
article is suitably designed and safely made for its intended purpose." 32 N.Y.2d at 340-41, 298
N.E.2d at 627, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 468. See also Noel, supra note 11 at 110 n.78, 111 n.81. The court
in Powers v. Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 532, 219 N.W.2d 393 (1974), rev'd sub nonm
Greiten v. La Dow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 235 N.W.2d 677 (1975) interpreted the definition of strict
liability in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) to mean that the burden of proof
shifts from the plaintiff to the defendant to establish nonnegligence. 64 Wis. 2d at 536, 219
N.W.2d at 395.
48 See Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
49 In its approach to dog-bite cases, Wisconsin has treated strict liability as analogous to negli-
gence per se. In Nelson v. Hansen, 10 Wis. 2d 107, 102 N.W.2d 251 (1960), the court construed
the Wisconsin strict liability statute, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 174.02 (West 1974), as having "dispensed
with the necessity of proving scienter . I..." d. at 119, 102 N.W.2d at 258. Where negligence
can be shown by an owner's neglect to properly control a dog, proof of scienter is not necessary.
The court indicated that the statute was intended to relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proving
facts within the knowledge of the defendant. See Wurtzler v. Miller, 31 Wis. 2d 310, 143 N.W.2d
27 (1966).
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burdened with proving the state of defendant's knowledge as to the
viciousness of his dog is also accommodated. To be sure, state B in a
domestic setting has decided that a shift in the liability standard is ap-
propriate, thus making irrelevant any testimony as to defendant's
knowledge about the dog. Nonetheless, the multistate rule goes a long
way toward furthering the goals of state B. Indeed, an argument can
be made that everything state B sought to accomplish by imposing
strict liability is effected by the multistate rule. If the major concern of
state B was, in truth, the allocation of proof to the proper party, its
decision to shift to strict liability may have been done as a matter of
judicial convenience. Although state B may have determined that, as a
matter of justice, the burden of persuasion of nonnegligence should be
shifted to the defendant, it may also have decided that, as a practical
matter, it would be exceedingly difficult for the defendant to carry this
burden. Thus, state B may have imposed strict liability for the sake of
judicial economy. If this is the case, the policy of state B favoring strict
liability over shifting the burden of proof is principally procedural and
is designed to erase from the court calendar domestic cases in which
litigation of the negligence issue is likely to result in a verdict against
the defendant. This policy simply is not compelling in a multistate case
that is idiosyncratic and that requires another state's legitimate policy
to be taken into account.
APPROPRIATE OCCASIONS FOR UTILIZATION OF MULTISTATE RULES
The availability of a multistate rule that can accommodate the
conflicting interests of concerned jurisdictions still demands an inquiry
into whether the fact pattern reveals a true conflict-of-laws situation.
Thus, one must honestly confront basic choice-of-law theory; one can-
not merely jump to a comfortable compromise simply because it is
available for the asking. As von Mehren correctly noted, basic princi-
ples of equality require that a legal order not distinguish between do-
mestic and multistate situations unless the circumstances clearly justify
departing from the domestic norm.50 The authors believe, for example,
that there are no grounds for engaging a multistate substantive rule for
host-guest cases in a situation like Babcock. That case is so clearly a
false conflict from both an interest and neoterritorial analysi 51 that the
domestic common law rule of New York ought to govern.
On the other hand, we should not permit ourselves the delusion
that identification of state interests is an easy matter.5 2 When cases
50 Von Mehren 1974, supra note 12, at 357.
51 Other commentators have identified Professors Cavers and Twerski as leading exponents of
neoterritorialism in choice-of-law theory. See R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE, & H. KAY, supra note
16, at 339-45; J. MARTIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS 276-87 (1978).
52 Twerski, HOFSTRA, supra note 3, at 111; Rosenberg 1967, note 5 supra. Commenting on
Kell v. Henderson, 26 A.D.2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (A.D. 1966), Professor Rosenberg stated:
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present a mix of questionable interests and difficult territorial fact pat-
terns, we should not hesitate to employ the kind of multistate rule that
furthers the interests of the concerned jurisdictions. For example, in a
case like Milkovich v. Saarl,53 where a host and guest, each from a state
that limited recovery to gross negligence, had an accident in a common
law negligence state, a court need not agonize over whether the inter-
ests of the accident state in providing recovery should take precedence
over the liability-negating rule of the state in which the relationship
arose. The multistate rule, which permits the cause of action for negli-
gence but raises the burden of proof to "clear and convincing evi-
dence," resolves the problem in a fair manner.
The authors would go further, however. In Tooker v. Lopez,54 the
New York Court of Appeals was faced with the confrontation between
interest analysis and a fact pattern that was territorially dominated by
one state. In that case, three students at Michigan State University
were visiting in Detroit when the driver lost control of the car; one
passenger was killed and another seriously injured. In a suit on behalf
of the New York guest against the driver, also a New York domiciliary,
for the death of the passenger, a split court decided that the New York
rule of ordinary negligence should apply rather than the Michigan
guest statute. Resolution of this conflict through application of the sug-
gested multistate substantive rule would have avoided the doctrinal
split that set interest analysis in opposition to a territorial approach.
The court could have recognized the New York interest and still have
given substantial effect to the territorial demands of the fact pattern by
giving credence to Michigan concerns utilizing the suggested technique
of raising the burden of proof.
CONCLUSION
Multistate substantive rules are not a panacea for all choice-of-law
problems. Many areas remain where the policy differences between
states raise a genuine conflict regarding the proper way to resolve a
problem. For example, a state that refuses to impose civil liability on a
tavern owner for selling liquor to an inebriated person who is later in-
volved in an auto accident may be in direct conflict with the policy of
Searching for governmental interests presupposes that the purposes behind substantive rules
are so clear, so singular, so univocal that we can hope to discover them with some certainty
and some consensus. This is at odds with reality. Even the simple rules that raise rights and
duties with regard to personal injuries are a composite of thrusts and counter-thrusts of many
kinds. For instance there are many substantive rules favoring recovery for negligent injuries;
but contributory negligence, assumption of risk, workmen's compensation exclusions and
other rules are opposed to recovery. To try to bring all the huffing and puffing together into a
policy that runs clearly in one direction and that has a measurable intensity that permits
comparing it with some contrary policy is, in my judgment, pure fantasy.
Rosenberg 1967, supra note 5, at 464.
53 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
54 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
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the plaintiff's home state that grants such recovery and does so both as
a matter of justice to the injured party and as a deterrent to that kind of
activity on the part of tavern keepers.5 5 Similarly, a state that refuses to
enforce gambling contracts may be in irreconcilable conflict with a
state that encourages that activity on the part of its business enter-
prises. 56 Conflict theory will have to resolve these kinds of problems.
That multistate substantive rules do not purport to resolve all conflicts
questions, however, is hardly grounds for disregarding them. Only
doctrinaire choice-of-law thinkers will reject them out of hand. A judi-
ciary that is fact-sensitive and willing to experiment with practical solu-
tions to heretofore intractable problems should give them serious
attention.
55 Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976). See
Bars Have Hangover From Big Judgments in Drinkers' Mishaps, WaU St. J., Aug. 23, 1978, at 1,
col. 4, for a recent assessment of the strength of the policy clash and resultant effects on tavern
keepers. But see von Mehren 1977, supra note 12, at 42.
56 See Ciampittiello v. Campitello, 134 Conn. 51, 54 A.2d 669 (1947); Intercontinental Hotels
Corp. v. Golden, 15 N.Y.2d 9, 203 N.E.2d 210, 254 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1964).
